Abstract-The MDS property (aka the k-out-of-n property) requires that if a file is split into several symbols and subsequently encoded into n coded symbols, each being stored in one storage node of a distributed storage system (DSS), then an user can recover the file by accessing any k nodes. We study the so-called p-decodable µ-secure erasure coding scheme (1 ≤ p ≤ k − µ, 0 ≤ µ < k, p|(k − µ)), which satisfies the MDS property and the following additional properties:
I. INTRODUCTION
Data replication is the most common way for distributed storage systems (DSS) to guarantee high data availability and node failure tolerance. Most of the current distributed storage systems are using 3-way replication where each piece of data is replicated three times and each of its copy is stored at a different storage node in the system. If at most two storage nodes are down, the data is still available at at least one node. However, 3-way replication is highly inefficient in storage overhead, as only a very modest portion 33% of the whole storage capacity can be used. As the demand for data storage scales up quickly, replication based storage systems incur significantly high cost in terms of storage footprint and power usage for cooling systems. It is well known that erasure codes [1] possess lots of advantages over replication [2] . Giants such as Microsoft, Facebook, and Google have, therefore, included erasure codes, alongside replication, in their distributed storage systems [3] , [4] , [5] . Illustration for perfectly p-decodable µ-secure erasure coding scheme. Partial decoding starts when the first µ + p nodes are accessed. At this point, the first subset of p file symbols (s 1 , . . . , s p ) is reconstructed. When the first µ + 2p nodes are accessed, the next subset of p file symbols (s p+1 , . . . , s 2p ) can also be decoded. In fact, if the user requests only (s p+1 , . . . , s 2p ), it is sufficient to access the first µ nodes and the nodes numbered from µ + p + 1 to µ + 2p. The general requirement for partial decoding is: (s rp+1 , . . . , s (r+1)p ) can be reconstructed by accessing the first µ nodes and p additional nodes numbered from µ+rp+1 to µ + (r + 1)p. We always assume that p|(k − µ).
In this work we investigate a construction of erasure coding schemes for DSS that are secure in terms of data confidentiality: even when some of its storage nodes are compromised or eavesdropped by some unwanted party, the stored file is still kept confidential. Moreover, such secure codes must provide easy partial decoding for a legitimate user, which can often access more nodes than an illegal adversary. We proposed the so-called p-decodable µ-secure erasure coding scheme (1 ≤ p ≤ k − µ, 0 ≤ µ < k), which satisfies the MDS property (the file can be reconstructed by accessing any k out of n storage nodes) and the following additional properties: (P1) strongly secure up to a threshold: an adversary which eavesdrops at most µ storage nodes gain no information (in Shannon's sense) about the stored file, (P2) partially decodable: a legitimate user can recover a subset of p file symbols by accessing some µ + p storage nodes. Regarding (P2), throughout this paper we always assume that p|(k − µ). In other words, we can always partition the set of k − µ file symbols into subsets of size p each. Apart from (P1)-(P2), if the following additional property is also satisfied, the scheme is referred to as perfectly p-decodable µ-secure: (P3) weakly secure up to a threshold: an adversary which eavesdrops more than µ but less than µ + p storage nodes cannot reconstruct any part of the file, We illustrate the properties of a perfect coding scheme in Fig 1. Code rate Strong security threshold Weak security threshold Partial decodability threshold Systematic erasure code k/n 0 0 1 Codes for (erasure) wiretap channel II [6] , [7] (k − µ)/n µ N.A. N.A. Ramp secret sharing scheme [8] , [9] , [10] (
Comparison among five erasure coding schemes. Strong (weak) security threshold refers to the maximum number of storage nodes that the adversary is allowed to access without jeopardizing the strong (weak) security of the scheme. Partial decodability threshold refers to the number of nodes an user has to access to start decoding the file partially. Here 0 ≤ µ ≤ k−1, 1 ≤ p ≤ k − µ, and p|(k − µ). When p = 1 and µ = 0, the (perfectly) p-decodable µ-secure scheme is actually systematic. An 'N.A.' entry means that the corresponding threshold can take any value and that threshold is not even considered in the design of the coding scheme.
Note that when p = k − µ, only (strong and weak) security is guaranteed and there is no partial decodability: an user cannot retrieve any part of the file by accessing less than k nodes. Such a secure coding scheme was first studied in the work of Yamamoto [8] in the context of ramp secret sharing scheme. Recently, superregular matrices (all square submatrices are invertible) such as Cauchy matrices have also been employed to construct such codes [9] , [10] . Similar work in secure regenerating codes, which can be regarded as vector erasure codes with optimal node repair, can be found in [11] , [12] .
In this work we address the gap in the literature regarding partial decodability of erasure coding schemes. In our proposed coding scheme, while Property (P1) and Property (P3) provide (strong and weak) security, Property (P2) guarantees partial decodability: once the user accesses p more nodes than the strong security threshold µ, it can start to decode some subset of p file symbols. A secure erasure code that supports partial decoding is particularly useful in applications involving retrieval of large files. A typical example is in video streaming services, where a large-size video is often split into chunks and these chunks are then streamed one by one to the user. Our proposed coding scheme, if employed in such services, would provide not only confidentiality but also ease of partial retrieving of the video to any desired level. We stress that extending the existing secure coding schemes by taking into account partial decodability does not result in any overhead.
Small field
Large field p-decodable µ-secure * ∀µ, ∀p N.A. II: A summary of existence of (perfectly) p-decodable µ-secure coding schemes. The entries with an asterisk ' * ' are the new results established in this work. A field is "small" if its size is a polynomial in n and k, or "large" if otherwise.
Our main contribution is summarized below.
• We provide an explicit construction over small fields for p-decodable µ-secure coding schemes for any p and µ.
• We provide an explicit construction over small fields for perfectly p-decodable µ-secure coding schemes when p = 1 (for every µ), and when µ = 0, 1 (for every p, p|k − µ).
• We prove that perfectly p-decodable µ-secure schemes exist over sufficiently large fields for almost all p and µ. The paper is organized as follows. Section II provides necessary notation and definitions. The construction of p-decodable µ-secure schemes is presented in Section III. We discuss the existence of perfect coding schemes in Section IV. The paper is concluded in Section V.
II. PRELIMINARIES

A. Notation
Let F q denote the finite field with q elements. Let [n] denote the set {1, 2, . . . , n}. For a vector u = (u 1 , . . . , u n ) ∈ F n q , let u T denote the transpose of u. For any n ≥ 1 let I n denote the identity matrix of order n. We also use O to denote the all-zero matrix of certain size.
Below we define standard notation from coding theory (see [1] ). The (Hamming) weight of u is wt(u) = |{i : u i = 0}|. 
A code attaining the Singleton bound is called maximum distance separable (MDS). Any vector in a code is referred to as a codeword. A generator matrix of an [n, k] q code is a k × n matrix whose rows are linearly independent codewords of the code.
B. Coset Coding Technique
Let r = (r 1 , . . . , r µ ) be a vector of independent and identically uniformly distributed random variables over F q . Let S = (S 1 , . . . , S k−µ ), where S i 's (i ∈ [k −µ]) are independent and identically uniformly distributed random variables over some alphabet F q . We assume that the file to be stored in the system is s = (s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s k−µ ) ∈ F k−µ q , a realization of S. We call k − µ the file size and each s i a file symbol.
We denote by D(n, k) a DSS with n storage nodes where the file can be recovered from the contents of any k out of n nodes. Node i (i ∈ [n]) stores a coded symbol c i , which is a function of the file symbols s i 's and the random symbols r j 's. Let c = (c 1 , c 2 , . . . , c n ). Let C = (C 1 , C 2 , . . . , C n ) be c's corresponding vector of random variables over F q . We only consider here scalar linear erasure coding schemes, based on [n, k] q MDS codes, described as follows. The file s ∈ F k−µ q is encoded to c = xG ∈ F n q , where
code. We often refer to G as the coding matrix. It is well known in coding theory [1] that if Node i stores c i produced as above then the file can be recovered by accessing any k nodes. For the coding scheme to be strongly secure against an adversary that can access µ nodes (see Definition 1), the last µ rows of G must generate an [n, µ] MDS code. In fact, this is an equivalent way to describe the coset coding technique invented by Ozarow and Wyner [6] . This technique has been widely adopted in the network coding literature to secure a network code against a wiretapper (see, for instance [13] and references therein).
C. Security and Partial Decodability
We assume that an adversary can eavesdrop/access any m storage nodes of its choice and tries to learn illegally the content of the stored file. We refer to m as the adversary's strength. In the following definitions, recall that S = (S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S t ) represents the file stored in the system. Definition 1. An erasure coding scheme for a DSS D(n, k) is called strongly secure against an adversary of strength m (m < k) if the entropy
We also refer to such a coding scheme as strongly m-secure.
In words, a coding scheme is strongly µ-secure if an adversary which can access an arbitrary set of at most µ storage nodes cannot obtain any information at all about the stored file. It is well-known that as long as the bottom µ × n submatrix of G also generates an [n, µ] MDS code then the coding scheme described in Section II-B is strongly µ-secure. The MDS code generated by such a matrix G is often called a nested MDS code in the literature. 
for all j ∈ [k − µ] and for all subsets E ⊆ [n], |E| ≤ m. We also refer to such a coding scheme as weakly m-secure.
The following lemma specifies a necessary and sufficient condition for the weak security of the erasure coding scheme described in Section II-B. A detailed proof for the lemma can be found in the full version of this paper [14] .
be the stored file and r = (r 1 , r 2 , . . . , r µ ) be some random vector over F q . Let (s | r)M , where M is a k × m matrix over F q , represent the m coded symbols stored at some m storage nodes that the adversary has access to. Then the adversary cannot determine any particular file symbol s i if and only if the column space of M does not contain e i for every i ∈ [k − µ], where e i is the unit vector with only one nonzero coordinate at the ith position.
The intuition behind the proof of this lemma is explained below. As the adversary obtains (s | r)M , it can linearly transform these coded symbols by considering the product , we derive the conclusion in Lemma 3. After Yamamoto [8] , the concept of weak security was also discovered by Bhattad and Narayanan [15] in a more general context of network coding. Weak security is important in practice since it guarantees that no meaningful information is leaked to the adversary, and often requires no additional overhead. For instance, suppose that the file s = (s 1 , s 2 , s 3 ) is to be stored in a DSS with four storage nodes, which tolerates one node failure. Using an usual systematic erasure code, the four nodes store c = (s 1 , s 2 , s 3 , s 1 + s 2 + s 3 ). However, if an adversary can access any node among the first three, then it can retrieve some s i , which is part of the file. On the other hand, if the file is encoded into c = (
, then an adversary who accesses one storage node would not be able to determine any s i . Indeed, for instance if it observes s 1 + s 2 , then it cannot determine the exact value of either s 1 or s 2 , as for the adversary, both s 1 and s 2 are completely random variables. If s is a video and s i 's are movie chunks, then by using the latter coding scheme, an adversary who observes one storage node cannot determine each chunk, and hence, cannot play any part of the movie. Such coding scheme is said to be weakly secure against an adversary of strength one, or weakly 1-secure. Moreover, that coding scheme consists of the same number of storage nodes and can also tolerate one node failure, hence introduces no storage overhead compared to a normal systematic code. In fact, while strong security always comes with a cost in storage capacity, weak security is often given for free.
Definition 4.
We consider the coding scheme described in Section II-B, where G is a generator matrix of an [n, k, n − k + 1] q MDS code and the file s ∈ F k−µ q is encoded into the coded vector c = (s | r)G ∈ F n q . Suppose that 0 ≤ µ < k, 1 ≤ p ≤ k − µ, and moreover p|(k − µ). The coding scheme based on G is p-decodable µ-secure if it satisfies the following properties simultaneously.
(P1) It is strongly µ-secure as defined in Definition 1. (P2) It is p-decodable: each subset of p file symbols {s rp+1 , s rp+2 , . . . ,
can be reconstructed from the content of some µ + p storage nodes.
The coding scheme is perfectly p-decodable µ-secure if it satisfies the following additional property:
We also say that the corresponding coding matrix G is (perfectly) p-decodable µ-secure.
Remark 5.
• A (perfectly) 1-decodable 0-secure code is simply a systematic code in the classical sense, where each file symbol is stored as is (in its clear form) at some node.
• A perfectly (k − µ)-decodable µ-secure code is the type of secure codes studied in the work of Yamamoto [9] and Olivera et al. [10] .
We illustrate the concept of perfectly p-decodable µ-secure coding scheme in the following example.
The coding scheme is
We show below that this coding scheme is perfectly 2-decodable 1-secure. Firstly, it is easy to verify that G generates a [6, 5] 11 MDS code. Therefore, the file can be reconstructed by accessing any five storage nodes. The bottom 1 × 6 matrix also obviously generates a [6, 1] MDS code, hence guarantees that the scheme is strongly 1-secure. Hence (P1) is satisfied. To verify (P3), note that µ + p − 1 = 1 + 2 − 1 = 2. We can easily verify that any two columns of G do not generate an unit vector e i for every i ∈ [4] . Hence, according to Lemma 3, the coding scheme is weakly 2-secure. Lastly, for (P2), we prove that each of the 2-subsets {s 1 , s 2 } and {s 3 , s 4 } can be reconstructed by accessing some three nodes (µ + p = 3). Indeed, by accessing the first three nodes, an user obtains the product T then we obtain s 2 . Hence, {s 1 , s 2 } can be reconstructed by accessing the first three nodes. Similarly, we can verify that {s 3 , s 4 } can be reconstructed by accessing Node 1, Node 4, and Node 5.
III. A CONSTRUCTION OF p-DECODABLE µ-SECURE
CODING SCHEMES We establish in this section a general construction for pdecodable µ-secure erasure coding schemes, which satisfy (P1) and (P2): an adversary which can access the content of µ storage nodes gains no information about stored file, and a legitimate user can retrieve each subset of p file symbols by accessing some µ + p storage nodes.
A. A General Construction
We start with the definition of superregular matrices, which is critical in our construction.
Definition 7 ([16]).
A superregular matrix is a matrix where every square submatrix is invertible.
Two well-known constructions of superregular matrices are via Cauchy matrices and Vandermonde matrices [17] . A Cauchy matrix is a matrix of the form C = 1/(x i − y j ) i,j where x i 's and y j 's are distinct elements of any finite field F q . Cauchy matrices are superregular by themselves. The following straightforward results about superregular matrices are especially useful in our construction.
Then the following hold.
• Any submatrix of C is also superregular.
• Any subset of k rows of
Hence, every nontrivial vector generated by these k rows has weight at least n − k + 1.
• Any subset of n columns of C (1 ≤ n ≤ k), generates a [k, n ] MDS code. Hence, every nontrivial vector generated by these n columns has weight at least k − n + 1.
We now describe our general construction, using the so-called partial superregular matrices.
Main Construction.
• Step 1. Choose any superregular k × n matrix G and write it in the following block form.
• Step 2. Perform elementary row operations to turn the matrix A at the top-left corner into an all-zero matrix. We can do so by adding certain linear combination of the last µ rows of G to each of its first k − µ rows. Note that the µ × µ matrix D is invertible, hence its rows can generate any vector of length µ. The resulting matrix, referred to as G , can be presented in block form as below. Since there is no row operation performed on the last µ rows, the three block submatrices D, E, F are the same in G and G .
• Step 3. Perform elementary row operations on the first k − µ rows of G to turn the square submatrix B into a new square matrix B of the same size determined as follows. It is a block diagonal matrix where each block submatrix is of size p×p. Moreover, except from the zero entries, all other entries, which belong to those block p×p submatrices, are the same as the corresponding entries in B . Equivalently, B can be obtained from B by turning those entries that do not belong to any block diagonal submatrix into zero. We can write B in the block form as below, where
Such transformation can always be done because both B and B are invertible. Thus, the coding matrix G, as the output of Step 3, is determined by G = T G , where the transform matrix T is
We can write G in block format as follows.
where C = BB −1 C . Note that the coding matrix G produced by the Main Construction has the same entries as the original superregular matrix G , except for those zero entries and entries in block submatrix C. Therefore, we often refer to G constructed in this way as partial superregular matrix. We illustrate the steps to construct a partial superregular matrix in Example 9.
Example 9. Let k = 5, n = 6, q = 11, µ = 1, and p = 2.
Step 1. Let us choose G to be a Cauchy matrix 6 3 7 9 8 6 4 9 5 2 7 4 3 2 10 8 10 9 2 7 1 5 4 5 10 1 9 
Step 2. As the bottom-left entry is nonzero, we can add certain multiple of the last row to each of the first four rows of G to obtain Step 3. Finally, we can perform certain elementary row operations on the first four rows to obtain the coding matrix 
which is proved earlier in Example 6 to generate a (perfectly) 2-decodable 1-secure coding scheme.
The following lemmas assert that a coding scheme based on a partial superregular matrix, which is produced by the Main Construction, is indeed p-decodable µ-secure.
Lemma 10. The partial superregular matrix G produced by the Main Construction generates an [n, k] MDS code. Moreover, the last µ rows of G also generates an [n, µ] MDS code. As a consequence, the coding scheme based on G has the MDS property and moreover, satisfies (P1) (i.e., being strongly µ-secure).
Proof: As G generates an [n, k] MDS code and G is obtained from G by applying only elementary row operation, G generates the same [n, k] MDS code. Since the last µ rows of G are the same as those of G , they also generates an [n, µ] MDS code. Hence (P1) is satisfied.
Lemma 11. An erasure coding scheme based on a partial superreregular matrix G (Main Construction) always satisfies (P2): each subset of p file symbols {s rp+1 , s rp+2 , . . . , s (r+1)p } (0 ≤ r ≤ (k −µ)/p−1) can be reconstructed from the content of some µ + p storage nodes.
Proof: Recall that the file s is encoded into c = (s | r)G. We prove that the first p file symbols {s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s p } can be reconstructed from the first µ + p coordinates of c. In general, it can be proved in a similar manner that for each r where 0 ≤ r ≤ (k − µ)/p − 1, the p file symbols {s rp+1 , s rp+2 , . . . , s (r+1)p } can be reconstructed from µ + p coordinates of c, namely c 1 , . . . , c µ , and c µ+rp+1 , . . . , c µ+(r+1)p .
The coding matrix G produced by the Main Construction can be presented in the block form as follows.
According to the structure of G, the first µ + p coordinates of c can be written as
where
be the ith column in the inverse of B 1 (1 ≤ i ≤ p). Moreover, let u ∈ F µ q be the column vector satisfying Du = −E 1 v. Then
where e i = (0, . . . , 0, 1, 0, . . . , 0)
T with a '1' at the ith coordinate. Therefore, the user can reconstruct s i as follows.
As i can be chosen arbitrarily between 1 and p, we conclude that an user which has access to the first µ + p coordinates of c can reconstruct all s i for 1 ≤ i ≤ p. The proof follows.
Theorem 12. The Main Construction produces a coding matrix that generates a p-decodable µ-secure coding scheme for all 0 ≤ µ < k and 1 ≤ p ≤ k − µ, p|(k − µ).
Proof: According to Lemma 10 and Lemma 11, the Main Construction produces a coding matrix that generates a coding scheme satisfying both (P1) and (P2). Hence, such scheme is p-decodable µ-secure, according to Definition 4.
IV. ON PERFECTLY p-DECODABLE µ-SECURE CODING SCHEMES In this section, we first prove that a coding matrix produced by the Main Construction in Section III-A also satisfies (P3) when p = 1 (∀µ) and when µ = 0, 1 (∀p). Finally, we establish the existence of perfectly p-decodable µ-secure coding schemes over sufficiently large fields for almost every p and µ (namely, k ≥ 2(µ + p) − 1).
A. The Case p = 1
A (perfectly) 1-decodable µ-secure coding scheme is the best scheme among all strongly µ-secure schemes in terms of partial decoding. Such a scheme allows the user to reconstruct one file symbol right after the user accesses one more node than the security threshold µ. It is a sharp turn from knowing nothing about the file to being able to reconstruct one file symbol. In fact, according to Lemma 11, after accessing the first µ nodes, accessing any additional node would give the user one new file symbol. Hence, beyond the threshold µ, the coding scheme works in a similar manner as the conventional systematic coding scheme. Note that when p = 1 and µ = 0, a (perfectly) 1-decodable 0-secure coding scheme is nothing other than a normal systematic coding scheme.
Lemma 13. When p = 1, the Main Construction produces a matrix G that generates a (perfectly) 1-decodable µ-secure coding scheme for any µ ≥ 0.
Proof: When p = 1, (P3) is satisfied trivially. Hence, the Main Construction yields a coding scheme satisfying simultaneously (P1), (P2), (P3). Such a coding scheme, according to Definition 4, is perfectly 1-decodable µ-secure.
B. The Case µ = 0
A perfectly p-decodable 0-secure coding scheme is of particular interest because of the following properties.
• Weak security with no overhead on storage capacity: the scheme provides weak security against an adversary which can access up to p − 1 storage nodes. Such an adversary cannot reconstruct any part of the stored file. Moreover, no storage overhead occurs compared to a normal erasure coding scheme: the file size is k and the code is an [n, k] MDS code. That is because there are no random symbols employed in the scheme.
• p-partial decodability: the user can reconstruct each subset of p file symbols by accessing certain p storage nodes.
Lemma 14. When µ = 0, the Main Construction produces a matrix G that generates a perfectly p-decodable 0-secure coding scheme for any p ≥ 1, p|k.
Proof: Due to Lemma 10 and Lemma 11, it suffices to prove that the coding matrix G produced by the Main Construction generates a coding scheme satisfying (P3) -weak security. According to Lemma 3, we aim to show that any set of p − 1 (= µ + p − 1) columns of G does not generate an unit vector of weight one. As p|k, we consider the following two cases: k = p and k ≥ 2p.
If k = p, as µ = 0, the coding matrix G is simply the same as the input superregular matrix G . By Lemma 8, any set of p − 1 columns of G generates a [p, p − 1, 2] MDS code, hence never generates an unit vector e i , which has weight less than two. Therefore, according to Lemma 3, the coding scheme based on G is weakly secure against an adversary which can access at most p − 1 nodes. Hence (P3) is satisfied.
We now assume that k ≥ 2p. When µ = 0, the matrix G has the following form.
We assume, by contradiction, that some set L of p−1 columns of G generates an unit vector e i ∈ F k q . Without loss of generality, we can assume that i = 1. For simplicity, we slightly abuse the notation and also use L to denote the set of indices of the columns in L. Then there exist some coefficients
where G[j] denotes the jth column of G. Note that the p × p block matrix B 1 is a square submatrix of a superregular matrix G , and hence is invertible. Therefore, there exists a linear combination of the first p columns of G that generate the vector −e 1 . In other words, there exist some coefficients β j ∈
By (4) and (5), we deduce that
Hence, there exists a linear combination of these at most (2p− 1) columns of G that is equal to 0. Note that we assume k ≥ 2p. Moreover, according to Lemma 10, G is an [n, k] MDS code. Hence, any set of at most k columns of G must be linear independent. We obtain below a contradiction by arguing that the linear combination of at most 2p − 1 < k columns in (6) (5), we deduce that β j = 0 for all j ∈ [p]. Therefore, in the linear combination (6) , while the first sum consists of p columns of G with all nonzero coefficients, the second sum is a linear combination of p − 1 columns of G. Hence, there must be at least one term in the first sum that cannot be canceled out. Thus, (6) is a nontrivial linear combination of less than k columns of G. This conclusion contradicts the fact that any k or less columns of G must be linearly independent.
C. The Case µ = 1 Lemma 15. When µ = 1, the Main Construction produces a matrix G that generates a perfectly p-decodable 1-secure coding scheme for any p ≥ 1, p|(k − 1).
Proof: See the full version of this work [14] .
Theorem 16. The Main Construction produces a coding matrix that generates a perfectly p-decodable µ-secure coding scheme when p = 1 for every µ ≥ 0, µ < k, and when µ = 0, 1 for every p ≥ 1, p|(k − µ).
D. Existence of Perfect Coding Schemes Over Large Fields
In the theorem below we show that perfectly p-decodable µ-secure erasure coding schemes exist over sufficiently large fields for almost all p and µ. The problem of constructing such schemes explicitly over small fields (i.e. having polynomial size in n and k) is still open.
Theorem 17. For every 0 ≤ µ < k and 1 ≤ p ≤ k − µ, p|(k−µ), such that k ≥ 2(µ+p)−1, there exists a perfectly pdecodable µ-secure coding scheme over any sufficiently large field F q .
V. CONCLUSION
We propose in this work a method to construct erasure coding schemes which are not only (strongly and weakly) secure but also partially decodable. The partial decodablity feature is extremely important in applications such as media streaming, where it is usually not necessarily for the user to download the whole file before he or she can start the playback.
The type of erasure coding scheme developed in our work offer the flexibility between security and partial decodability. The system designer can adjust the security parameter and the partial decodability parameter accordingly to obtain any possible mixture of security and exposure of the stored data. We emphasize that we can construct an erasure code which is both secure and partially decodable without adding any extra storage overhead compared to a merely secure erasure code studied in the literature.
